Terror and Corruption in Mexico – Part Two

Nowhere are the consequences of PRI corruption more visible, or more viscerally disturbing, than in the growth in power of the Mexican drug cartels. There is hardly a region within Mexico not in the grip of one of the cartels. So how did Mexico get to this point?

Mexican drug production dates as far back as the late-19th century, when Mexican farmers began growing opiates for American consumption. Mexico became a transshipment point for cocaine as well at that time, when it was marketed “as a cure-all for everything from discolored teeth to flatulence.ⁱ” Marijuana production followed in the 1920s. Demand picked up noticeably as the American economy boomed after World War II. By the 1970s a mass market had developed for marijuana in “flower power” America, and the development of the highly addictive and inexpensive crack-cocaine saw a fateful explosion in its demand in the poorer African-American and Hispanic communities of the 1980s.

The United States had recognized the danger of drug consumption very early on, declaring its first “War on Drugs” under President Nixon in the 1970s. The PRI, however, viewed the problem much differently. As arbitrary rulers, the PRI were only concerned with threats to their own power. In this sense the growth of the cartels can be seen as a natural complement to their style of political rule: the cartels, much like the PRI, extracted rents by co-opting who they had to (the powerful) and exploiting who they could (the powerless).

Occasionally, the cartels would get out of line and bring pressure from the United States. The PRI, who historically maintained good relations with Washington (and thus accrued additional rents through loans and foreign aid), would then see to it that the cartels were reminded of their rightful place within the political pecking order. Gonzales describes this relationship:

The kingpins bought access to the Mexico-US border, and this access allowed them to expand their production and smuggling activities. The authorities in turn stuffed their pockets with cash—but also, crucially, kept relative public peace and a semblance of law and order through the containment (rather than the destruction) of drug syndicates. Direct confrontation meant risking public disorder and violence, and indeed whenever authorities went after traffickers, bloody shootouts ensued. But such confrontations were the exceptions rather than the rule.ⁱⁱ

A string of embarrassing arrests of high-level government officials in the 1990s indicates that the PRI eventually did begin to appreciate the gravity of the drug problem. Still, it would be a stretch to say that the PRI was ever truly committed to eliminating the power of the cartels. A more likely scenario would appear to be that the PRI’s actions in the 1990s were merely a last ditch attempt to head off rising domestic and international pressure.

The mordida – The bite of corruption

On an individual level, the absence of law as an equalizer can be quite frightening, because in a society where the ruling elite operate outside of the law the police become the instrument by which the rule of force is implemented. Political corruption thus begets legal corruption, since legal power necessarily flows from political power. Thus it should not come as much of a surprise when entire police departments in Mexico are discovered to be running as racketeering businesses. Such was the sad case of Arturo Durazo Moreno, chief of police of Mexico City from 1976-82. Moreno was discovered to have run his entire bureau as a criminal racket, extorting residents of Mexico City as if he were the head of a local mafia.

As we can see, the PRI’s idea of political stability came at a steep price for the Mexican people, though scholars disagree as to whether the price was worth it. To some, Mexico “achieved remarkable political stability, an envious economic record, and a reasonably free and open political system” when compared to other Latin American authoritarian regimes. Certainly, the PRI may be given credit for the political stability it achieved in Mexico. The problem, as the chaos of the current drug war has shown, is that stability is fleeting when unaccompanied by lasting rules and principles embodied in what we know as the rule of law. To this extent the PRI’s achievement has a Pyrrhic quality, sacrificing the long-term health and society of Mexico for short-term, and often ill-gotten, gains.

Development and the rule of law

The social costs of Calderon’s war on Mexico’s drug culture have been enormous, and many have questioned whether it has been worth the price. What this article would like to stress is the long-term costs associated with allowing the cartels “to live and let live,” as the PRI had done. Since a society in which organized crime cooperates hand in hand with the government is by definition one in which law does not rule, the drug war must be viewed within the greater context of the role it plays in Mexico’s development and the rule of law.

In an enlightening essay concerning economic development in Latin America, Adam Przeworski and Carolina Curvale analyzed the role of politics over the long-term. They found that the type of political system in a given society is less important than its long-term effectiveness in structuring and absorbing conflicts. Though the PRI was successful in this respect early in its history, it failed to establish the institutions necessary to prevent the conflict we see in Mexico today.

This issue has been particularly pertinent to the Latin American experience. “Perhaps the single most important institutional deficit that runs through virtually all Latin American countries,” Francis Fukuyama argues, “has to do with a weak rule of law.”ⁱⁱⁱ “This includes not just property rights,” Fukuyama continues, “but physical security against crime and access to the legal system more generally, particularly for the poor.”^iv

Without equal protection provided by the law, the law simply becomes another instrument of arbitrary power that negatively impacts individuals’ trust in one another, thereby increasing risk and transaction costs and harming the economy.

The rule of law, then, is seen as more of a long-term guarantor of economic growth than a short-term solution to it. Many states have impressive economic growth in the short-term without a vigorous legal system. However, as the Economist has pointed out, “few countries have sustained gains in growth without improving their rule of law, and places that have grown without such improvement have subsequently lurched backwards.” ^v

Seen in this context, Mexico’s problem with the cartels extends far beyond the realm of counter-narcotics. It cuts to the heart of the developmental challenge of Mexico: the weak rule of law. Following the law and development theory, state corruption can be said to be a primary culprit behind Mexican underdevelopment and the growth of the drug cartels. Bret Stephens perhaps put it best when he said states like Mexico “did not become basket cases on account of the drug trade. It is the fact that they were basket cases to begin with that allowed the drug trade to flourish.”

Those who operate outside of the law must be brought within its fold. Even if the government is successful, however, it cannot stop there. Without respect for legal norms, protection of human rights and judicial fair process, the state will never progress far beyond its culture of corruption. It is a bloody battle, but one Mexico must fight, and one it must win.